S.O.E. History
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Vol.

ARCHIVES

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FILE NUMBER	SUBJECT
SOE HISTORY 110	HOLLAND
VOLUME	HISTORY OF DUTCH SECTION
	PART 2
	General
FROM 1940	
TO	Produced by Captain M B Mills (period Dec 1940 - Dec 1943) Lt Colonel R J Dobson (Period January 1944 - July 1945)

DUTCH SECTION HISTORY.

DECEMBER 1940 - DECEMBER 1941.

PREAMBLE.

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF SECTION.

The Section became an independent entity on Dec 20th, 1940, when Mr. R.F. LAMIN was placed in charge.

II. SITUATION AT THAT TIME VIS-A-VIS THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES.

Grave difficulties immediately confronted the Section, due mainly to the opposition of the chief of the Dutch Secret Service, Mr. VAN'T HANT, whose influence was extremely great, and whose obstructive attitude made it impossible to obtain the services of Dutchmen of military age, whilst, at the same time, it closed valuable sources of general information. As a result of this attitude the prevailing outlook of Dutch officials was one of non-co-operation based partly on fear of VAN'T HANT, and partly on considerations set forth in the following paragraph.

III. NATURE OF DUTCH OFFICIAL CIRCLES.

All authority naturally derived from Queen WILHELMINA. The appointment of ministers had to be approved by her. The circle from which they could be recruited was of necessity limited to the relatively few possible candidates already in the U.K., most of whom were politicians of the old parties. The influence of VAN'T HANT on the Queen was quite uncanny and permeated many spheres in which he was not directly interested.

GERBRANDY, the Prime Minister, was sincere but weak. Thus many ministers and functionaries were imbued with the necessity for confining their activities to the strict limits of their official duties, fearing that any extraneous commitments might involve displeasure and possible dismissal. Obviously their underlings followed the same line. The result was complete apathy so far as such schemes as ours were concerned.

This state of affairs rendered it necessary for the Section to decide to go forward with the preliminary work without consulting the Dutch. It is, however, highly probable that such activities as were initiated were known to VAN'T HANT, whose system of espionage was notoriously thorough.

IV. RECRUITING.

The situation as above outlined made it essential to confine efforts at recruitment to people not connected with the Netherlands Government, thus reducing the available field to an unhealthily small circle.

/ V. ...

V. PRELIMINARY RECONNAITRING.

Consideration was given to the possibility of landing agents by sea, and the support of the R.A.F. was enlisted for reconnaissance flights over the northern islands of HOLLAND. This plan was fraught with difficulties of all kinds. It was a hazardous undertaking at the best, and preparations for it were complicated by the lack of local knowledge.

In March 1941, the question of dropping agents by parachute was discussed. This proposal had previously been rejected as the opinion was that the topography and population density of HOLLAND were unfavourable. Another reason was that it was extremely difficult to secure the right type of man for this highly specialised type of infiltration.

As landing by sea turned out impracticable when attempted in July 1941, parachuting was decided upon and training arrangements instituted.

VI. PERSONNEL.

During the period Dec 1940 - Dec 1941 the staff of the Dutch Section at H.Q. consisted of :-

Mr. H.V. LANING. (Chief)
LT. R. LANING.
Maj. LOEFF.
Maj. PINCOCK.
Lt. DAWSON. } Conducting
Lt. KAY. } Officers
Mr. BINGHAM.
Lt. HEPKEP.

AGENTS SENT.

SEPTEMBER 1941.

On the night of Sep 7th two agents were dropped, viz. HENNING and STEEN, constituting Operation GLASGOWIE A.

MISSION:

Apart from sundry possible contacts for securing general intelligence, they were to contact one JAN BOTTEMA, who was to be advised of this organisation's existence and general intentions. They were also to sound BOTTEMA about sea communications.

FIELD HISTORY:

Nothing was heard from either of the agents, or about them, until on Jan 4th 1942 a W/T operator sent out with a subsequent operation (CATAREN) reported that one of them had set out for the U.K. The other was said to have been caught in early October, escaped and gone into hiding. It subsequently transpired that STEEN left by boat on Nov 13th. No more was ever heard of him and he was presumed lost. HENNING was successfully exfiltrated on a trawler and landed in the U.K. on Feb 20th 1942, bringing with him two more Dutchmen who were put into training as agents.

HOWARD brought back certain general information about internal conditions, but it was impossible to send him back again as he was too well-known to escape detection.

OCTOBER 1941. No despatches.

NOVEMBER 1941.

This is the next month in which agents were sent. The operation was known as "CATAREN" and consisted of :-

TIMMER - Organiser.
LOOMAN - W/T Operator.

They left on 5th November 1941.

MISSION:

Their mission was divided into two parts :-
(a) To contact the two GLASHOUSE couriers sent in September and to assist them to return.
(b) Thereafter to proceed with the organisation of sabotage groups in the West of HOLLAND.

FIELD HISTORY:

Nothing was heard from these two agents until Jan 4th 1942 when the message about GLASHOUSE arrived. Traffic proceeded in a reasonably satisfactory manner and CATAREN reported good progress with the proposed sea-route to be arranged via ROTTERDAM (then known as BRANDY).

By January 1942, the Germans were aware that attempts were being made to build up sabotage organisations under guidance from LONDON. Their prime source of information was a Dutchman named RIDDERHOF who acted for them in penetrating an existing organisation near NIJMEGEN. As a result they found out about a projected dropping of containers from LONDON scheduled for the end of February.

Two containers were dropped on the 27th, and were handed over to RIDDERHOF by Capt. van den BERG, chief of the reception committee "for safe keeping". This seems to have been done unwittingly by van den BERG. This incident convinced the German counter-espionage, led by Oberstleutnant GIRKES and Sonderführer HUNTEMANN that somebody was in direct communication by W/T with the U.K. Priority was accordingly given to locating the operator. By the beginning of March, the street in the HAGUE where LOOMAN was transmitting was discovered. The district was raided and on the 6th March LOOMAN was arrested.

According to two reports made since the capitulation by GIRKES and HUNTEMANN (as well as one by a certain EEP, who will be referred to in another section of this history), LOOMAN was soon persuaded to turn and operate under German control. On the 18th March, he sent message No.17 calling for more supplies and stating that a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous. Thenceforward all his traffic was German controlled. The implications of this are apparent but will be referred to in more detail in the subsequent comments on the general situation in the field during 1942-3.

In fairness to LOOMAN, it must be added that he endeavoured to attract the attention of London H.Q. to the fact that he was controlled, by omitting to give identity checks when sending his telegrams.

LOOMAN was moved from HOLLAND to GERMANY in the summer of 1944. He was in BATHENOW when the Russians arrived and was liberated on April 25th, 1945, arriving in ENGLAND on May 21st.

TIMMER, after working successfully with LOOMAN, had the misfortune to get into touch with an agent provocateur known as JOHNNY, who caused him to be shadowed. On the 18th March 1942, TIMMER made an attempt to rescue one of his group from German captivity; he was arrested during the attempt. The Germans did not, at the time, appreciate the importance of their capture. TIMMER refused to talk at first, but later on, being convinced that the whole organisation was blown, he gave details of his mission. His soldierly behaviour was described by GINGES as exemplary.

Details of his subsequent movements are not clearly established, but he was eventually sent to MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp, where he was shot on September 6th 1944.

DECEMBER 1941. No despatches.

1942

DUTCH SECTION - GENERAL

I. PERSONNEL OF S.O. SECTION.

January - February, 1942 :-

Mr. R.V. LAMING. (Chief)
Major PINNOCK.
Major LOEWE.
Lt. DAWSON.
Lt. KAY.*
Capt. BINGHAM.*
Lt. KNIGHT.*

March - December, 1942 :-

Major SLILARD. (Chief)
Capt. BINGHAM.*
Lt. KNIGHT.*
Sub. BOND. (A.T.S.)
Lt. SUMING.
Lt. MILLS.
Lt. KAY.* } Conducting
Lt. PARR. } Officers.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE DUTCH AUTHORITIES.

The situation at the end of 1941 could not be described as satisfactory. It seemed apparent that until we could get our affairs segregated from the mass of high level intrigue and allocated to a specific chief with a suitable and adequate department in close contact with our section, little progress could be made. Our efforts were, accordingly, directed to that end. In February 1942, with the advent of the new section chief of S.O.E. H.Q., Major SLILARD, efforts were intensified to reach an understanding with the Dutch.

Eventually Colonel de BRUYNE, of the Netherlands Marines, was placed in charge of the M.I.D. (Militaire Inlichtingen-Dienst = Military Intelligence Service), assisted by Capt. LIENTINCK, also of the Netherlands Marines, and Lt. SCHILP of the Netherlands Navy.

Co-operation between the M.I.D. and S.O. Dutch Section was cordial and close, but for some time de BRUYNE's position was insecure and unhappy, due to intrigues against him on high levels. In these intrigues the hand of VAN 'T SANT was again evident. He resented the encroachment on his previously unchallenged supremacy in "secret" affairs, and also disliked de BRUYNE personally. There was also the fact that military circles viewed with disfavour the assumption by a naval man of power in a sphere which, considered theoretically, could not be called connected with the Navy.

In May the intrigues had reached such a pitch that de BRUYNE, in spite of his anxiety to co-operate with us, was fast finding his position untenable. He was an honest, open kind of man who was unable to cope with the "palace intrigue" in which he became entangled. His desire was to get on with the job and he suffered from an undermining of his authority and position by powerful self-seeking people

/ of limited vision

of limited vision and mediocre minds. Negotiations on a high level took place aiming at a clarification of the position, culminating in the intervention of Prince BERNHARD. The result was, eventually, that de BRUYNE's position was strengthened, with a consequent revival of his enthusiasm. More energetic steps were taken to provide us with suitable recruits, and the standard of the men sent to us for training was, on the average, high.

In April a plan was worked out known as the "Plan for HOLLAND", (to be the subject of an appendix to this section of the history). It was elaborated in collaboration with the Dutch and Col. de BRUYNE spent much time in discussing it with us, so that co-operation between S.O.E. Dutch Section and his office was very close. It continued so during the whole year in spite of vicissitudes in de BRUYNE's career.

OUTLINE OF PLANNING FOR THE FIELD IN 1942.

During the first three months of the year, as is evidenced by the details of the agents' missions, efforts were directed towards establishing in HOLLAND a nucleus of men who could undertake preparatory work for future operations on a large scale, to follow a concerted plan. This preparatory work may be analysed as follows:-

(a) The establishment of satisfactory arrangements for the reception of personnel and stores.

(b) The establishment of efficient lines of communication between the U.K. and the Field.

(c) The recruiting of helpers prepared to participate in more extensive action later.

(d) The commission of undetectable acts of sabotage along specific lines.

(e) The instruction and training of men in sabotage and subversive work generally.

All this programme was designed gradually to lead up to the introduction of much more ambitious and far-reaching schemes to be eventually worked out in conjunction with the plans of the Allied High Command.

In April the first draft of the "Plan for HOLLAND" was drawn up and submitted to Col. de BRUYNE's office for consideration and discussion. It was eventually completed in its final form and the agent commissioned to initiate it in the field was JURRIENS (operation MARROW). The salient points of the Plan were as follows :-

1. It has as its object the creation of a "Secret Army".

2. The activities of the Secret Army are divided into two phases, viz:

PHASE A.

(a) The disruption of enemy communications on or soon after D-Day, according to the strategic plan and the tactical situation.

(b) The prevention, by this disruption, of the removal to GERMANY of Dutch locomotives and rolling-stock.

PHASE B.

(a) After D-Day, the provision of direct support, behind the enemy's lines, to forces in the field.

(b) The prevention of demolitions by the enemy ;

(i) of objectives (bridges, power-stations, dock facilities etc.) which the advancing Allied armies will wish to use.

(ii) of other objectives constituting scorched-earth policy.

The plan was supported by a wealth of military and industrial intelligence, classified in appendices to the final form, and, commencing with agent JUNGENS, (Operation [illegible]) organisers and instructors were given all facilities for a detailed study of its objects and implications.

Apart from this Plan, a directive was issued by General JUNGENS covering the general policy to be followed during the last quarter of the year. This was :-

1. To extend contact and communication with the Orde Dienst so as to cover as many districts as possible, endeavouring at the same time to deliver arms and stores to them.

2. To continue to build up the sabotage organisations and to deliver arms and stores to them as far as possible without endangering their security.

3. To undertake undetectable sabotage of all forms of transport and of establishments working for the enemy, although railway lines should not be attacked until further orders.

Special note re operation FAMILY.

This agent was given a special mission at the request of the Dutch authorities. Under the details of his mission are given the main headings of his tasks, which were designed to provide the Dutch and us with up-to-date and complete details of all aspects of German measures in Occupied Holland - defences, communications, troop concentrations, movements, petrol stores, living conditions, Luftwaffe dispositions, Naval situations, war industries &c. The value of such information for general purposes, as well as in relation to the development of the "Plan for HOLLAND", is apparent.

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ACTUAL POSITION IN THE FIELD DURING 1942 AS REVEALED BY LATER DEVELOPMENTS.

The lines along which it was supposed and intended that activity in the field should develop are seen from the agents' missions, which were based on the plans formulated, details of which are found in the "Outline of Planning" attached to this history.

In reality, as is evident from the fate of the agents despatched during 1942, the position was that the German so-called "Ast-Niederlande", under the direction of one, Oberstleutnant GIRGS, had control over the whole of our organisation. Through that control, they were aware of our plans, and were able to carry out large numbers of arrests throughout the country, thereby stifling the development of resistance in general.

They concentrated on forcing or persuading W/T operators to work for them, and appear to have been largely successful. At the same time, by threats and cajolery they extracted as much information as possible about our organisation in ENGLAND, and our plans for subversive action in HOLLAND.

The original penetration was on the occasion of the capture of LOCMAN (operation CARPAGNE q.v.). From the "turning" of that agent dates the gradual assumption by the Germans of control over our activities, and this control continued undetected the whole of the year. Having all the cards in their hands, the Germans played them cleverly. They maintained heavy traffic on all circuits and described the 'successful" completion of sabotage projects which, of course, had never been carried out. In the case of operation "FANTASY" they realised that the fictitious collection of intelligence and its transmission to LONDON would involve an enormous amount of laborious work and a waste of W/T traffic to little or no purpose. They accordingly decided to eliminate him and his mission in a convenient way by advising us of his death as a consequence of an accident on landing. Actually, of course, he was in prison.

This is typical of the many ruses to which they resorted and with which they managed to support the facade which they had built. It follows that our plans were rendered nugatory and that during the year under review, we were under a completely false impression.

A G E N T [illegible]

JANUARY No despatches.

FEBRUARY

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible]
Date of departure - 27.2.42.

Instructions

1. Reconnoitring of southern sea route possibilities.
2. Arranging for the escape of some important Dutchmen such as Dr. COLIJN or Minister van DIJK.
3. Contacting Mr. L.J. van LOOY, a prominent social-democrat and Trade Unionist.
4. Organising sabotage cells in the AMSTERDAM [illegible] area, especially in shipbuilding and shipping circles.

Field History

[illegible] contacted van LOOY, who was running an underground paper called "[illegible]". He assisted van LOOY in the preparation and distribution of this paper. He also looked for suitable landing grounds and did a certain amount of intelligence work. In general, he did what he could to further the cause but never found a suitable W/T Operator so that he did not get into touch with LONDON. (He was to have communicated through the W/T operator of operation T[illegible], despatched shortly after him, but who was killed on landing.) He felt isolated and lost heart, eventually arranging his own escape via [illegible], whence he was exfiltrated via GIBRALTAR to [illegible]. In interrogation revealed that he did contact the [illegible] organiser, [illegible], but as the latter was [illegible] by a [illegible] agent, [illegible] cuted so to DESSING, GARROT dropped the attempt and never saw AMHERDAM again. He was thus without W/T communication and without contact with those agents from LONDON with whom he expected to work.

He found himself continually short of money, this in itself cramping his activities. As he was in no position to supply any sabotage organisation with material, he thought it futile to undertake the building-up of groups.

His investigation of possible sea-routes in the South convinced him that movement restrictions and defence measures precluded such a scheme being successful. To attempt the exfiltration of important people was also a task beyond his capacity.

The mission must be considered a failure due partly to bad luck and partly to DESSING's losing heart and consequently adopting a passive rather than an active attitude. He arrived back in the [illegible] on 2nd September 42, and has since been employed in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance.

MARIE

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] } rgendoor
[illegible] /T
Date of departure [illegible].3.42.

MISSION

1. To investigate the possible opening of a new and route for the use [illegible] [illegible]trati[illegible].
2. To reconnoitre specified targets in [illegible] T and to recruit men willing to sabotage them.

[illegible] HISTORY

[illegible] was killed on landing. [illegible] was arrested by the [illegible] in early April 1942, on information supplied by a woman [illegible] Details are not known [illegible] and recruited a local [illegible] operator known as [illegible] and it is thought that the Germans, by discovering the [illegible] signal [illegible] on [illegible] and's body were able to track down [illegible] whom they operated.

[illegible] was first sent to [illegible] Concentration Camp then to [illegible], [illegible] and finally to [illegible], where he was executed in Sep 1944.

Operation [illegible]
Agent - [illegible].
Date of departure - 27.3.42.

MISSION

1. To reconnoitre the telephone exchange near [illegible] suburb of the [illegible].
2. To deal with the [illegible] of the German Nachrichtdienst, containing an important telephone exchange.
3. To destroy or damage a large store of provisions and clothing for German Naval personnel at [illegible], near [illegible].
4. To damage as much as possible the petrol dock serving the aerodrome at [illegible], near the [illegible].

After completion of these tasks to return to the U.K. by a route to be arranged by us.

FIELD HISTORY.

The impending departure of [illegible] was signalled to [illegible] on March 19th in telegram No.21. He dropped on March [illegible]th to a Dutch reception committee under [illegible]. [illegible] advised [illegible] of his "safe" arrival in his telegram of 26th March 42, ref.CXG24.

He is alleged by the Germans to have offered voluntarily to work for them, and to have been used by the [illegible] for spying on his fellow prisoners at [illegible] Concentration Camp. This may be true but nevertheless, we have been advised that he was shot at [illegible] in Sep 1944.

[illegible]

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] (Organiser
[illegible]
Date of departure - 20.[illegible].42.

[illegible]

Organisation of sabotage groups and selection of dropping grounds.

[illegible]

[illegible] Arrested early May 1942 due to information given to the [illegible] by a Dutch traitor [illegible], of [illegible]. He was not heard of again until reported shot at [illegible] in [illegible].

[illegible] were tried at the same time as [illegible], and also as a result of information by Dr. [illegible]. First sent to [illegible] and subsequently transferred to various camps in [illegible]. [illegible] was finally traced in May [illegible] to one of the [illegible] camps, and was still alive then. [illegible] was alleged to have been transferred to an American hospital, but it has so far proved impossible to locate him and he must be regarded as "missing".

[illegible]

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] (Organiser
[illegible] (Assistant Organiser and instructor
Date of departure - 5.4.42.

[illegible]

Both men were to work in OVERJSSEL and to carry out -

(a) immediate acts of sabotage to hinder the enemy war effort.
(b) acts which would hamper and hinder the Germans in the event of their invading [illegible] and from [illegible] or of our invading the Continent via [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] were arrested soon after arrival. Both were first sent to [illegible] Concentration Camp and executed at [illegible] [illegible].

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible].
Date of departure - 1[illegible].4.42.

[illegible]

1. Organisation of ferry service between [illegible] and [illegible].
2. Arranging of suitable accommodation addresses where agents could leave messages asking to be brought back to [illegible].

FIELD HISTORY

Due to the arrest of [illegible] in April, the [illegible] were able to see her message sent on the "[illegible]" [illegible] contacted [illegible] through the contact that [illegible] was arrested on April 24th.

[illegible] was held at [illegible] for some time before being sent to [illegible] Concentration Camp. From there he probably went to [illegible], but this is not certain. He was eventually transferred to the [illegible] Camp, where he was executed in June, 1944.

[illegible]

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] sub-
[illegible] Organisers.
Date of departure - 29.5.42.

MISSION.

1. General. To investigate the possibilities of opening a new sea route for in- and ex-filtration, and to assist [illegible].
2. To prepare [illegible] and collect stores for the interruption of railway traffic when instructed by [illegible].
3. To carry out sabotage acts in general.

FIELD HISTORY

The two agents dropped to a Dutch reception committee, so were arrested on arrival. [illegible] was imprisoned at [illegible], but we do not know his ultimate fate, and he is still considered "missing".

Van STEEN was seen at RAVENS Concentration Camp in [illegible], in July 1944, but we have no subsequent news so he is also reported as "missing".

JUNE.

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible] (W.T.)
Date of departure - 22.6.42.

MISSION

1. To act as a T operator to [illegible] as well as to assist him generally.
2. To act, if necessary, as W.T operator to [illegible].

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped at the same time as [illegible] and arrested with him. Subsequently reported executed at [illegible] Concentration Camp in Sep 1944.

Operation - BURNIE.
Agent - Van RIETSCHOTEN.
Date of departure - 22.6.42.

MISSION:

(a) Organising and instructing groups of men for sabotage in the province of SUD HOLLAND.
(b) Arranging reception transport and storage of arms and material.

[illegible]

(c) Acts of opportunistic sabotage.
(d) Maintaining [illegible] and [illegible]
(see under [illegible]).

FIELD MARSHAL

From LONDON's telegram of 15th June 1942 No. 28 to [illegible], the [illegible] warned of the impending arrival of [illegible] was arrested on arrival as the reception committee was [illegible]. He was imprisoned in [illegible] Concentration Camp, [illegible] on 2nd 1943. He apparently left there with van der [illegible] of operation [illegible]. A German source states that he was arrested with [illegible] whilst travelling in the train from [illegible] to [illegible], and that he was subsequently executed. No confirmation of this exists and he is listed as "missing."

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] (Organiser)
[illegible] (W/T)
Date of departure - 26.6.42.

JULIAN.

To contact leaders of the "Orde Dienst" and to explain to them the "Plan for [illegible]" which had been compiled in London and agreed between the British and Dutch authorities. Thereafter, to organise the recruiting of suitable bodies of men to implement the plan. Details of [illegible] are given under the heading "Outline of Planning". Thirdly, to organise reception committees.

FIELD MARSHAL

LONDON advised [illegible] on the 15th, in telegram No. 61, of the proposed despatch of these two agents as from the 24th. They were both arrested on arrival, their "safe" lair being advised to us by [illegible] on June 2nd.

JANSEN was transferred from [illegible] Concentration Camp to [illegible], in [illegible], where he was seen in February 1944. He was subsequently reported to have been executed at [illegible] in Sept. 1944.

BOEREN was also transferred to [illegible] and shot at [illegible] in Sept. 1944.

JULY.

Operation - LUCK A.
Agent - Van [illegible]
Date of departure - 23.7.42.

MISSION

To amplify the instructions given to [illegible] (operation [illegible]) before departure, and to have a report made out as to his progress, such report to be enciphered and collected by us.

FIELD MARSHAL

Arrested on landing, July 24th 1942. No further news of him until May 1945, when he was reported executed at [illegible] in Sept. 1944.

AMOUR No despatches.

[illegible]

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - BEST-[illegible]-DUBOIS-[illegible]
Date of departure - 24.9.44.

[illegible].

Having studied exhaustively the "Plan for [illegible]" given to [illegible] was to be prepared to relieve [illegible] of his duties and to take over from him as soon as possible continuing his work. [illegible] was to be exfiltrated but this was not [illegible] task but that of [illegible] (see operation [illegible]).

[illegible] MISSION

Dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and arrested on 2[illegible] th Sept 1942. He was seen at [illegible] Concentration Camp in July 1944, but in May 1945 he was reported executed at [illegible] in Sept 1944.

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - MOOGLEVER-FORTUNE.
Date of departure 24.9.42.

[illegible].

Based on the "Plan for [illegible]". To work in with [illegible] and [illegible] (see notes re [illegible] operation). Specific tasks were :-

(a) To organise without delay two reception committees for stores and men.
(b) To arrange for transport of such stores to suitable places in the region.
(c) To tell [illegible] by what means he can arrange to be exfiltrated.
(d) To tell [illegible] of the impending arrival of his successor and of organiser-instructors for the operation of the "Plan for [illegible]"
(e) To assist [illegible] in all possible ways.

FIELD HISTORY.

Dropped to German-controlled reception committee and arrested at once (25.9.42). After being held for a time in [illegible], he was transferred to [illegible], and is known to have been there in June 1944. He was ultimately sent to [illegible] where he was executed in Sept 1944.

Operation - [illegible].
Agent - JOINGLE.
Date of departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION.

This man, an older type than usual and extremely reliable, was

/ sent at

sent at the request of the Dutch authorities. His tasks were -

a. To contact the leaders of the Inlichtingendienst "I D", the secret intelligence organisation in Holland [illegible] to explain to them [illegible] the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, and to seek to use the channel for instructions from LONDON to the "I D". This organisation to be used at once to give all possible assistance to the Dutch by providing reports, information, agents and any other help necessary for him in the execution of his duties as the Dutch Government's official envoy.

Details of the headings under which intelligence was to be collected and forwarded, will be found in the "General" summary for 1942.

FIELD HISTORY.

Dropped to German-controlled reception committee and arrested 2th Sept 1942. The Germans, finding JONGELIE's mission too involved for them to pretend in their traffic back to ENGLAND that it was being carried out, decided to report that he was killed on landing.

Our latest information is to the effect that he was eventually shot at BUCHENWALD Concentration Camp on 6th Sept 1944.

Operation - CARTLEDGE
Agent - MOOY
Date of Departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION.

1. To assume the duties of Regional Commander for VERMOEN or SELEHEUVD in connection with the "Plan for Holland". The new sphere as to the region allotted to be made by [illegible]. In this capacity to give guidance and instruction to the personnel already recruited.
2. To organise the reception of personnel and stores.
3. To do the ground work necessary for the eventual exfiltration of MARROW by Lysander.

FIELD HISTORY

Dropped to German-controlled Reception Committee. Arrested at once and imprisoned at HAAREN Camp. Nothing further is known of him and he is considered "missing".

OCTOBER.

Operation - CARBOLIC.
Agent - Van der GIESSEN.
Date of Departure - 1.10.42.

MISSION.

1. To join PARSNIP and to assist him in organising sabotage in the province of ZUID HOLLAND, concentrating on transport in all forms.
2. Reconnoitring possible reception grounds in the area.

FIELD HISTORY

Van der GIESSEN was arrested on arrival, the Reception Committee being German-controlled. He was imprisoned in HAAREN Concentration Camp, but escaped on the night of Nov.22/23 1943. Since that time reports of his whereabouts have been circumstantial and varied. It is confirmed that he did escape and that he made his way to the ROTTERDAM area. He endeavoured there to help underground activities. According to one German interrogation, he became involved with an organisation dealing in the manufacture of false documents.

He was proceeding by train from ROTTERDAM towards South HEVELAND, accompanied by one WEGENER (Operation LAGROSSE, to be referred to under that operation), when he was arrested. The same source stated that he was shot later on, but we have no proof and still regard him as "missing".

Operation - CELERY.
Agents - [illegible] Instructor)
[illegible] (- do)
MADARE (W/T)
Date of departure - 21 and 24.10.42.

MISSION

The two instructors' duties were :-

(a) Reconnoitring of targets.
(b) Instruction of sabotage groups in handling of weapons, explosives and incendiaries.
(c) General steps to raise efficiency.

FIELD HISTORY

Dropped to German-controlled committees and arrested at once. All three agents were reported by a returned French agent to have been seen at RAVICZ Concentration Camp, in [illegible], in July 1944. [illegible] and [illegible] were subsequently shot at [illegible] Concentration Camp in Sept 1944. Nothing is known of [illegible], who is still "missing".

Operation - [illegible] B.
Agent - Pass.
Date of departure - 21.10.42.

MISSION

Regional organiser for any area in the South of HOLLAND to be decided by the leader of the "Secret army ", in connection with the "Plan for HOLLAND" already mentioned.

FIELD HISTORY.

Arrested on arrival by German-controlled committee. Sent to HAAREN Concentration Camp. Seen in July 1944 at RAVICZ Concentration Camp. Reported shot at [illegible] Camp in Sep 1944.

Operation - [illegible]
Agents [illegible] Instructor,
[illegible] - do -
[illegible] W/T
Date of departure - [illegible]
[illegible] 24.10.42.
[illegible] 21.10.42.

MISSION

(a) To assist leaders in reconnoitering targets and considering best methods of attacking them.
(b) To instruct sabotage groups in the handling of weapons, explosives and incendiaries.
(c) Generally to step to bring all aspects into an efficient state. [illegible] these points in the light of the "Plan for [illegible]"

FIELD HISTORY

Arrested on arrival. HOSSTTE was sent to [illegible], whence he was moved to [illegible], where he was seen by an escaped French agent. He was executed at [illegible] Camp in [illegible] 1944. [illegible] was also at [illegible] and [illegible], and event ual suffered the same fate as [illegible], being executed at [illegible] in [illegible] 1944.

[illegible] was imprisoned at [illegible] and then supposedly moved to [illegible], but this is not certain. His fate is unknown.

Operation - [illegible]
Agents - [illegible] W/T)
[illegible] Organiser,
Date of departure - 2 .10.42.

MISSION

In connection with the "Plan for [illegible]",

(a) To take charge, as Regional Organiser, of the Provinces of [illegible]
(b) In this capacity to organise, train and instruct bodies of suitable men and to perfect the organisation according to instructions from the leader as well as in the light of [illegible] own discretion.
(c) To organise the reception of the necessary stores.

FIELD HISTORY

Both dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and were arrested on 28.10.42.

BAUER disappeared thereafter as far as any news was concerned but we have recently heard from [illegible] sources that he died in VIENNA from tuberculosis, shortly after the liberation of that city.

DAGE - Advice has been received that he was executed at [illegible] Concentration Camp in September 1944.

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible]
Date of departure - 28. 1.42.

[illegible]

In connection with the "Plan for [illegible]", to act as a W/T operator for the leader under whom he was placed, and to [illegible] orders.

FIELD HISTORY

Dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and arrested on 19th November 1942. Sent to [illegible] and thence to [illegible] SILESIA. Subsequently executed at [illegible] on [illegible].

NOVEMBER.

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible]
Date of departure - 25.11.42.

MISSION

On the basis of the "Plan for [illegible]",

a. To reconnoitre targets and consider how best to attack them.
b. To instruct groups of saboteurs and trainees in the use of weapons and explosives.
c. To act with initiative under the orders of a designated leader.

FIELD HISTORY

Arrested immediately on arrival, [illegible] 1942, by a German controlled reception committee. No news was received until June 1943 when we ascertained that he was executed at [illegible] on [illegible].

Operation - [illegible]
Agent - [illegible] W/T Operator
Date of departure - 25.11.42.

MISSION

To work as W/T operator for the secret military organisation envisaged under the "Plan for [illegible]"

FIELD HISTORY

Arrested at once by a German reception committee. He was taken to [illegible] and subjected to intensive interrogation thereafter being placed in a cell and kept there until August 2nd 1944, when he escaped with DOUGLEN, of operation [illegible] referred to where that operation. He made his way to [illegible] where he arrived on the 19th November, reaching [illegible] on [illegible].

His interrogation, with DOUGLEN was very thorough and prolonged and revealed a mass of information which made it clear that the Germans were in control of our organisation. The implications are obvious, and will be referred to in detail

under the

under the "General" paragraph relative to the time of the interrogation.

The agent was under a cloud for a long time, and eventually transferred to the Detroit office in some position connected with the Netherlands Merchant Marine.

DOCKERSEL.

No despatches.

[illegible]

O P E R A T I O N S - 1942

(a)	Total "successful" sorties	57
(b)	Aircraft lost	3
c	Total Containers	282
(d)	Stores delivered.	
	H.E.	6,960 lbs.
	Stens.	460
	T.S.D.	19
	Grenades	3,170
	Pistols	1,305
	Incendiaries	45 cells.
	Clams:	495
	Limpets.	68

(3)

- - - -

[illegible]

I. PERSONNEL OF DUTCH SECTION.

January - February, 1943 .-

Major BLEZARD. (Chief)
Major ADNRIAM.
Capt. GILLIT
Capt. MILLS
Mr. OLLER.
Lieut. SPENING.
Lieut. PARR.
Jnr.Cdr. BOND. A.T.S.

March - December, 1943 .-

Major ADNRIAM. (Chief)
Capt. GILLIT.
Capt. MILLS.
Mr. OLLER.
Lieut. SPENING.
Lieut. PARR.
Jnr.Cdr. BOND. A.T.S.
Lieut. MORTLOCK. (J.S.A.)

II. RELATIONS WITH THE DUTCH AUTHORITIES.

These continued good throughout the year. Col. de BRUYNE and Capt. LEEFTINCK co-operated closely with us, but the former was never free from the cramping influence of "back-stage" intrigues against him. Eventually he relinquished his duties as Chief of the M.I.D. (towards the end of 1943) and Capt. LEEFTINCK, assisted by Lt. SCHILP, carried on. As will be seen from the attached summary of the real position in the field, towards the end of the year certain facts came to light which eventually showed that our organisation was hopelessly penetrated. In addition, losses in aircraft were heavy, and for a period of about three months air operations were suspended on this account.

Thus, whilst our relations with the Dutch personnel continued good, the amount of operational contact with them was not great, due to the paucity of despatches, this in turn being a result of the causes above mentioned.

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

[illegible]	GUILDERS.
[illegible]	3,000.
[illegible]	12,000.
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	17,000.
[illegible]	14,000.
[illegible]	12,000.
[illegible]	5,000.
[illegible]	100,000.
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	3,000.
[illegible]	6,000.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	10,000.
[illegible]	2,500.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	5,000.
[illegible]	7,500.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	7,500.
[illegible]	6,000.
[illegible]	2,500.
[illegible]	2,500.
[illegible]	2,500.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	10,000.
[illegible]	2,000.
[illegible]	5,000.
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	7,500.
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	2,000.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	2,500.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	4,000.
[illegible]	31,000.
[illegible]	1,000.
[illegible]	10,000.
Gross Total	355,500.
Less amount recovered from Dutch authorities.	128,750.
Net Total.	226,750.

JANUARY & FEBRUARY 1944.

[illegible]

The year 1944 opened up with a complete " impasse ", no prospects of improving the situation and complete dissatisfaction in both the Dutch and [illegible] camps.

It is obvious that if Colonel de Bruyne [illegible] and the complete [illegible] of [illegible] members in [illegible] they would have been able to supply [illegible] with reliable contacts [illegible] to build up a [illegible] However, through the lack of communication between the [illegible] and Colonel de Bruyne's office [illegible] the [illegible] action and [illegible] on the other hand, a complete breakdown [illegible] ensued.

Colonel de Bruyne was in disfavour and he resigned his post early in February [illegible] and [illegible] with Colonel [illegible] head of the Dutch Army and for [illegible] the Dutch Minister for War in the latter's absence for a [illegible] regard. This meeting took place on the [illegible] February [illegible] which Colonel [illegible] emphasised the importance of being well informed as to the [illegible] of the [illegible] and stated that circuits with which the Dutch Information Service [illegible] wish to contact, should not be [illegible] with [illegible] the [illegible] of the wishes of the latter in [illegible] of the [illegible] apparently consisted, according to him, of a small group of [illegible] who wanted to revive the old cause of [illegible] parliamentary parties [illegible] were already jockeying for [illegible] power after the liberation. [illegible] and that as a result, the Dutch Cabinet were in a completely false [illegible] case [illegible] that [illegible] was necessary [illegible] with a wide view at the head of all resistance [illegible] with the people in occupied Holland. [illegible] was extremely [illegible] at [illegible] head of the [illegible] and considered him to be at the root of all the trouble in the Dutch Government Circles.

It is therefore evident that, in a sense the Dutch Government themselves were dissatisfied at the state of things and would have welcomed a strong [illegible], if this was possible. On the other hand [illegible] who were fully aware of the [illegible] state of affairs in Holland, can hardly be blamed for not [illegible] at that time. Their circuits would have obviously been penetrated.

In view of Colonel de BRUYNE's resignation and the general situation S.O.E., decided [illegible] to make changes. [illegible] DE JONG a meeting was held in February with the Netherlands Minister for War, His Excellency DR. [illegible] DE JONGE, to discuss the general situation and Major General [illegible] S.I.S, in his letter to LUDTHE DE JONGE of 23 February, stressed the urgency of building up an effective organisation in the Netherlands to implement the directives of the SUPREME COMMANDER for D-Day action and that Commander JONES, regional director for BELGIUM, would henceforth be responsible for all policy matters in regard to S.O.E., operations in HOLLAND.

On the 13th.March, the Netherlands Minister for War was informed that Lt.Col. R.I. DOBSON., who had had three years experience in the [illegible] action, vice [illegible], had been nominated to take charge of the Dutch Section and that S.O.E., welcomed the nomination of Major General J.W. van OORSCHOT as replacement for Colonel de BRUYNE.

Major General VAN OORSCHOT took up his appointment on the 15th.March resumed his office the B.B. [illegible] and Lt.Col.R.I.DOBSON took over from [illegible] on 26th.February 1944.

STUDENTS IN TRAINING. 20.

AGENTS IN THE FIELD NIL.

MAY - [illegible] - [illegible] 1945.

[illegible]

[illegible] On this day, [illegible] tion was [illegible] that the German troops would surrender at [illegible] if they got an assurance [illegible] would not be [illegible] to [illegible] as prisoner of war. [illegible] matter [illegible] but before the answer to this question [illegible] received, [illegible] tion of all German forces in [illegible], [illegible] had not arrangements between [illegible] and [illegible] surrender of the [illegible] forces [illegible] the [illegible] by [illegible] were now valid for these forces also.

One of these conditions was that the German forces would be concentrated in certain areas to be designated by [illegible] to proceed to these areas [illegible] from the [illegible] Holland, and [illegible] that they were allowed to retain the arms until [illegible] taken place. This immediately put a [illegible] on the [illegible] surrendering of the forces of the interior which [illegible] now became even more limited.

On Saturday [illegible], at 1000 hours, a meeting to which [illegible] was invited took place between [illegible] and [illegible] discussed the situation and the necessary measures to be taken.

This was followed by a meeting [illegible] with [illegible] General [illegible] was felt that the forces of the interior had to be recognized as they would, as from now, appear armed in public. [illegible] was felt [illegible] that the 49th Division would march into Amsterdam [illegible] Sunday [illegible] that [illegible] would be held responsible for any incidents or any disorders which might interfere with the smooth settlement of events [illegible]. General [illegible] pointed out that certain communications were extremely bad and that in order to give the necessary orders to his troops he asked [illegible] whether we could not [illegible] consider postponing the entry of the 49th Division by [illegible] hours as otherwise it would be practically impossible for him to prevent [illegible] and he thought that this was rather unfair. [illegible] agreed that, if German communications were so bad, we would postpone the entry [illegible] by [illegible] hours. [illegible] then pointed out that if the [illegible] appeared armed in the streets while his troops had not been informed of the true state of affairs, and in view of the very high feeling of the Dutch population against the Germans, this would certainly lead to incidents, as his troops would have to protect themselves by making use of their arms. He again inquired whether GENERAL [illegible] & PRINCE BERNHARD would consider ordering the Resistance Groups not to carry arms until such time as first Corps had taken full charge and German troops were disarmed as, if he was to be held responsible for any incidents, this would be an almost impossible task for him.

GENERAL [illegible] & PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that this situation might lead to great disturbances, which had to be avoided at

At Air Costs & Field [illegible] agreed to order all [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] public [illegible] further [illegible].

[illegible] the effect [illegible] [illegible] be allowed to carry arms [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

mentioned incident [illegible] in order to eliminate the [illegible] of [illegible] might create trouble, PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that he would telephone [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 1920 [illegible] therefore decided to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] the fact that [illegible] leave their [illegible] of the [illegible] would [illegible] point [illegible] would be much [illegible] was [illegible]

[illegible] fact that [illegible] and reliably reported [illegible] by the [illegible] to be [illegible] short [illegible] of [illegible] areas. [illegible] were [illegible] compared with [illegible] in Western Holland [illegible]

[illegible] of the Resistance personnel would remain [illegible] organization. [illegible] they as well as [illegible] carry out [illegible] to be [illegible] be.

[illegible] all my Staff Officers and myself [illegible] every [illegible] to make clear to the allied [illegible] the [illegible] collaboration in [illegible] the Resistance forces [illegible] personnel. [illegible] fully [illegible] by these commanders.

7.0. [illegible] Aug. In [illegible] the general [illegible] crossed [illegible] at [illegible] temporarily joined [illegible] at [illegible], with a view to establishing the liaison which later became possible.

At that time the situation was still [illegible] food had been dropped to [illegible] strategic areas and, by a special arrangement with the [illegible], lorries containing food were brought [illegible] the [illegible] into Western Holland. [illegible] of these lorries were attacked, [illegible] by [illegible] some German [illegible] were still [illegible] dangerous and [illegible] of continued flooding came through. [illegible] In the meantime [illegible] made an [illegible] agreement with the [illegible] that if further sabotage etc., were stopped, they would [illegible] further executions [illegible] point [illegible] would be released.

The instruction [illegible] the Resistance forces [illegible] them to carry arms in the streets was well adhered to [illegible] very few incidents. [illegible] Resistance forces were eventually issued with proper military arm bands [illegible] special duties appointed by the Canadian Force Commanders. These duties consisted of maintaining law and order, rounding up [illegible] stragglers, undertaking guard [illegible] point duty, [illegible] bridges.

The first main task was the guarding of the [illegible] LINE, from the [illegible] to the [illegible] in order to prevent the population from the EAST streaming over into the western provinces where food was very scarce [illegible] to prevent possible [illegible] spreading back to the Eastern provinces. Special [illegible] were also placed on the bridges over the [illegible] River to prevent [illegible] or collaborators escaping back to Germany in civilian clothing. It is estimated that some 20/30,000 Resistance personnel were employed by the Canadians in some form or other.

When the 1st.Canadian Corps set up its H.Q. at [illegible], I.S.O. det. moved into [illegible] on Thursday, MAY 10. and M.E.27.

Set up its Mission on the 12th.May 1945 at [illegible]

The Mission consisted of the following officers

Lt.Col.[illegible] Dobson.	[illegible]
Major [illegible].	[illegible] 2.
Major [illegible].	[illegible] 3.
Capt. [illegible].	[illegible]
Capt. Tivey.	[illegible]
Capt. [illegible].	[illegible] 5.
Lieut. [illegible].	Staff Lieutenant.

[illegible] Lt. Dobson, the Mission's Wireless [illegible] and [illegible] Officers were [illegible] attached to the Mission.

Captain Hooper [illegible] also [illegible] to [illegible], were [illegible] retained by SHAEF [illegible] at the [illegible] to maintain [illegible] with the [illegible].

The Mission's initial function was the collecting [illegible] who had been warned [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] liaison with [illegible], [illegible] Hengelo District, [illegible] at the [illegible] Headquarters. Wireless material was collected [illegible] throughout Holland and all Regional Commanders [illegible] their areas visited.

DUNE & JULY 1945. [illegible] accompanied by [illegible] the Mission [illegible] 6th. [illegible] remained until the 4th.June [illegible] the morning [illegible] interest [illegible] famous underground telephone exchange [illegible] the area occupied [illegible] to the Mission. A party which was [illegible] by

Lieut.General [illegible] Prince Bernhard, [illegible] the Netherlands.	
[illegible]	
Brigadier Coulter-Ferryman,	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] de Ruyter.	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Van [illegible].	[illegible] staff
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Dep. [illegible]
[illegible] de Boer.	[illegible]
Capt. Tivey.	[illegible] 7.

This was followed by a small ceremony [illegible] a [illegible] was invested with the [illegible] of the [illegible] military by Brigadier Coulter-Ferryman.

In the afternoon a reception was held at the Mission [illegible] which was attended by all the principal Resistance personnel [illegible] throughout Holland and also the following:

Lieut.General [illegible] Prince Bernhard,
Lieut.General Ch. [illegible] [illegible] C. 1st.Canadian Corps.
The Regional Commanders & one saboteur leader of each of the 13 R.S.[illegible] regions.
Staff Officers of Prince Bernhard,
Staff Officers of the B.B.C.
Staff Officers of M.I.27., & [illegible].Det.

On Friday DUNE 8, Brigadier Coulter Ferryman & party accompanied by Lieut.Col. B.I.Dobson made an all day tour comprising visits to the Resistance [illegible] at [illegible] & [illegible].

The Mission completed its work of collecting surplus explosives, Regional Commanders' reports and disbanded on the 7th July, 1945 and returned to the U.K. on 10th July.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS - See APPENDIX " A " - WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS WITH HOLLAND and DAILY SUMMARY.

TOTAL LIST OF CASUALTIES - See APPENDIX " B ".

SABOTAGE SUMMARY - See APPENDIX " C ".

STORES' DELIVERY SUMMARY - See APPENDIX " D ".

SUMMARY OF DUTCH SECTION PERSONNEL - JAN 44/AUG 45 - See APPENDIX " E ".

FINANCIAL REPORT OF OPERATIONAL CHEQUES ISSUED DURING PERIOD JAN 44/MAY 45 - See APPENDIX " F ".

AGENTS SENT AND/OR DROPPED IN HOLLAND DURING PERIOD JAN 44/APR 45. - See APPENDIX " G ".

See Volume II for Regional Commanders' Reports.

- Finis -

APPENDIX " A ".

[illegible] COMMUNICATIONS [illegible] HOLLAND.

[illegible] 1945.

Plan Name.	Being used by.	Remarks.
[illegible].	[illegible].	Ended 3 May 45.
[illegible].	VALIDATE.	Liberated 6 May 45.
[illegible].	VALIDATE.	Liberated 6 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible] & [illegible].	Liberated 6 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible] & [illegible].	Liberated 7 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible], [illegible].	Liberated 10 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible].	Liberated 12 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible].	Liberated 12 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible] 2, [illegible] & [illegible].	Liberated 13 May 45.
[illegible].	[illegible].	Liberated 15 May 45.

[illegible]

APPENDIX " E "

SUMMARY OF DUTCH SECTION PERSONNEL.

JANUARY 1944 - END AUGUST 1945.

On the 1st. January 1944, the Dutch Section consisted of the following personnel :

Major	S. Bingham.	Section Head.
Jnr/Cmd.	S.I.Dobson. A.F.S.	Training Officer.
Capt.	A.O.Knight.	Operations'Officer.
S/Lt.	D.O.Bartlock R.N.	Asst. -do-
Mr.	S.H.Clink.	Communications.
Sgt.	W.A.Thomas R.A.F.V.R.	Asst. -do-
Capt.	W.E.Mills.	Admin. & Finance Officer.
Capt.	J.W.C. Kay.	Conducting Officer.
Lieut.	J. Deering.	-do-
Lieut.	A.C.Parr.	-do-

On the 26th.February 1944, Major S. Bingham relinquished his command of the Dutch Section and Major S.I.Dobson, who transferred from the Belgian Section, took charge.

The section underwent the following changes in additions, departures and promotions :

1944.	JANUARY	Departures	Capt. J.W.C.Kay.	
	FEBRUARY	-do-	Major S. Bingham.	
		Arrivals	Major S.I.Dobson.	
	APRIL	-do-	Capt.C.P.Dudley.	Assist. to S.E.
	MAY	-do-	S/Lt.E.Hooper.	Conduct.Officer.
		Promotions	Lieut.A.Deering.	To Captain.
	JULY	-do-	Mr.S.H.Clink.	To Captain.
	SEPT.	-do-	Lieut.E.Hooper.	To Captain.
		-do-	Lieut.A.C.Parr.	To Captain.
	OCT.	Arrivals.	W/Lt.E.O'C.Tandy.	Assist. Ops.
	NOV.	-do-	Lt.F.S.Gardiner.	Wireless Off.
1945.	JANUARY	-do-	Major R.A.Murphy.	Assist. to S.E.
		-do-	Capt. C. Tiver.	Asst.Ops.Off.
		-do-	S/Lt.W.E.Flower.	Asst.Training Off
		-do-	Capt.A.P.Troy.	Asst. W/T. Off.
		Promotions	Major S.I.Dobson.	To Lieut.Colonel.
	FEB.	-	Nil.	
	MARCH.	Arrivals	Ensign J.Dane.RNVR.	Training Asst.
		-do-	Capt.S.C.Bowden.	Asst. W/T. Off.
		Departures	Capt. A.C.Parr.	
		-do-	Capt. J. Deering.	
		Promotions	Capt. C.P.Dudley.	To Major.

1945.	APRIL.	Departures	- Capt. G.J.Bowden.
		-do-	- Capt. A.P.Irby.
	MAY.	-do-	- Ensign. J.Dane P.A.N.V.
	JUNE.	-do-	- F/Lt. E.C/G.Tandy.
	JULY.	-do-	- Capt. E.C. Merlook U.S.
		-do-	- Capt. E.M.Olink.
		-do-	- Jnr/Cmd. E.J.Beul.
		-do-	- Capt. S.C. Knight.
		-do-	- Lt. H.S.Gardiner.
		-do-	- Capt. G. Tivey.
		-do-	- F/Lt. H.M.Flower.
	AUG.	-do-	- Major C.F. Dadley.
		-do-	- Lieut. W.A. Thomas P.A.N.V.

Nucleus of Dutch Section as at 1 September 1945 - engaged on liquidation matters :

Lt.Col. E.I.Dobson.

Major W.A.Murphy.

Capt. W.H.Mills.

Attached to H.R.H.Prince Bernhard's staff as Wireless Communications' Officer :

Capt. H. Hooper.